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As a means of protecting the bank from unfair loss, section
4-407(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code subrogates the bank to the
drawer's rights against the payee.27 Presumably the bank recovers from
the payee in assumpsit on a theory of unjust enrichment. Though at
present there is little authority supporting this approach, it is fair
and logical.28
It is submitted that the following step-by-step approach offers
an acceptable solution to the problem presented by the principal
case: (i) Invalidate the exculpatory clause on a theory of public
policy or lack of consideration; (2) WAith the clause invalidated re-
quire the depositor-drawer to establish that he has sustained a loss
before the bank will be denied the right to charge his account; (3)
If the drawer establishes a loss, give the bank a defense if it can prove
that it exercised reasonable care in paying the check contrary to the
stop-payment order; and (4) If the bank cannot prove it exercised
reasonable care so that it cannot charge the drawer's account, sub-
rogate the bank to the drawer's rights against the payee.
HENRY C. MORGAN, JR.
IMPOSSIBILITY IN CONSPIRACY
Ordinarily, a crime cannot be committed unless the defendant ac-
complishes some result that the law seeks to prevent. There are two
exceptions to this general proposition: the inchoate crimes of conspir-
acy and attempt. In both conspiracy and attempt, the consummation of
cannot establish a loss under § 4-403(3), quoted in text, it would appear that the
bank could charge the drawer's account, thus eliminating any alternative remedy
against the drawer on the grounds of double recovery. Another aspect of this
conflict is discussed in Law Revision Commission (State of New York), Study of
Uniform Commercial Code 111 (1954).
2"If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the drawer
or maker or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for objection by the
drawer or maker, to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary
to prevent loss to the bank by reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank
shall be subrogated to the rights ...
(c) of the drawer or maker against the payee or any other holder of the
item with respect to the transaction out of which the item arose."
This section is a reasonable extension of section 4-403(3). It would appear that the
drawer would have to establish his loss before the bank would have any rights of
subrogation against the payee.
28Clarke and Bailey, Bank Deposits and Collections (under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code) 124 (1955). For a discussion of the procedural difficulties involved,
see id. at 126 and Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. Carver, 31 Tenn. App. 52o,
218 S.W.2d 66, 68 (1948).
CASE COMMENTS
the defendant's purpose is not an element of the crime.1 This gives
rise to the question whether these crimes of conspiracy and attempt
can be committed when the substantive crime contemplated is im-
possible, either inherently or legally. For instance, it is inherently im-
possible to pick an empty pocket. Some courts have held that to try
to do so constitutes attempted larceny2 and another court has held that
it does not.3 Similarly, under the common law it is legally impossible
for a boy under fourteen to be convicted of rape, because he is conclu-
sively presumed to be incapable of committing rape.4 Nevertheless,
some courts have said he can be convicted of an attempt to commit rape
and others have held that he cannot be.5
Ventimiglia v. United States0 presents the problem of whether there
can be a conviction of conspiracy to commit a crime which, under the
circumstances, it is legally impossible to accomplish. The individual
defendants, Ventimiglia and Parran, were the general manager and
labor relations advisor of the defendant company, Weather-Mastic,
Inc. They were charged with four substantive violations and with a
conspiracy to violate section 186(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act.7 This
section prohibits an employer paying money to "any representative of
any of his employees." Defendants paid money on four occasions to
Martin, the business agent for a labor organization, so that the com-
pany's non-union men could work on a job on which union labor was
required. The district court acquitted defendants of the four alleged
substantive violations, since Martin was not a representative of any
of defendants' employees. The trial court sustained a conviction of
conspiracy, however, on the theory that the crime was committed if
1Miller, Criminal Law § 31 (1934).
2People v. Moran, 123 N.Y. 254, 25 N.E. 412 (1890); People v. Jones, 46 Mich.
.141, 9 N.W. 486 (881); Regina v. Ring, 17 Cox C.C. 491, 66 L.T.R. (N.S.) 300 (1892);
Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. i170,
1185 (1957); Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 855 (1928).
3Regina v. Collins, 9 Cox C.C. 497, 169 Eng. Rep. 1477 (1864) (overruled by
Regina v. Ring, note 2 supra); Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Criminal At-
tempts, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1170, 1184 (1957); Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 Harv.
L. Rev. 821, 854 (1928).
'Miller, Criminal Law 3oo (1934).
1Cases supporting a conviction: Davidson v. Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L. Rep.
540, 47 S.V. 213 (1898); Commonwealth v. Green, 2 Pick. 38o (Mass. 1824). Cases
contra: McKinny v. State, 29 Fla. 565, 10 So. 732 (1892); Foster v. Commonwealth,
96 Va. 3o6, 31 S.E. 503 (1898). For discussion see Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The
Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 Yale L.J. 53, 56 (1931); Beale, Criminal At-
tempts, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 491, 498 (1903); Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 Harv. L.
Rev. 821, 840 (1928).
0242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957).
761 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1952).
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defendants intended to deal with Martin as a representative of their
employees.8 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the con-
viction. Since Martin was not a representative of defendants' em-
ployees, there could not be a substantive violation of section i86(a).
Therefore, the court held there could not be a conspiracy to violate
the statute even if defendants mistakenly thought Martin a represen-
tative of their employees.9
One basis on which the Court of Appeals rested its conclusion was
the following authority which holds that there cannot be a conviction
for attempt where there is a legal impossibility of committing the sub-
stantive crime. People v. Jaffeelo held that a person who receives goods,
believing them to be stolen, is not guilty of an attempt to receive
stolen goods if the goods in fact are not stolen, since it is legally im-
possible for him to commit the substantive act. Foster v. Common-
wealth" held that a boy under fourteen cannot be guilty of attempted
rape, since it is legally impossible for him to commit rape.
The prosecution's position that an indictable conspiracy can be
committed even though it is legally impossible to accomplish the object
of the conspiracy has what seems to be additional authoritative sup-
port. People v. Gardner2 held that an attempt to extort was com-
mitted, even though extortion was legally impossible, because the in-
tended victim, a police officer, experienced no fear, an element es-
sential to the crime of extortion. More pertinent to the present case is
Beddow v. United States,'3 where a conviction of conspiracy to defraud
the United States was sustained notwithstanding the fact that it was
legally impossible to commit the substantive crime, owing to the de-
fendants' mistake in having the forged bonds witnessed by a notary
public instead of designated officials who alone were authorized to
witness assignments of the bonds. In another case involving legal impos-
sibility, Craven v. United States,'4 the defendants were charged with
conspiracy to import liquor and beer without paying customs duties.
An instruction to the effect that it was sufficient to convict for con-
spiracy if the defendants thought the liquor was of foreign origin, even
if it were not, was held by the Court of Appeals to be proper.
Even though rightminded men can have divergent views concern-
8145 F. Supp. 37 (D. Md. 1956).
8242 F.2d 620, 626 (4 th Cir. 1957).
10185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 69 (igo6).
'-96 Va. 306, 31 S.E. 503 (1898).
32144 N.Y. ii9, 38 N.E. ioo3 (t894).
1370 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1934).
A22 F.2d 605 (lst Cir. 1927).
CASE COMMENTS
ing inchoate crimes and the weight to be given legal and inherent
impossibility,15 it is diffidently submitted that the reasoning and hold-
ing in the principal case are tenuous for the following reasons: (1) lack
of differentiation between attempt and conspiracy; 16 and (2) failure to
distinguish between a legal impossibility which covers' both the intent
and the act, and a legal impossibility which covers only the act and
does not cover the intent.
Although attempt and conspiracy are both inchoate crimes, there
is a significant distinction between the two1 7 which the Court of Ap-
peals did not seem to note. Proximity to success is critical in attempt.
Under the common law of conspiracy, on the other hand, the crime is
complete when two or more persons with criminal intent make an
agreement to assist each other in consummating the act.' s For instance,
if a man shoots at a stump mistakenly thinking it to be a man, it is
doubtful that he is guilty of an attempt to kill.19 Under the common
law if two persons agree to kill another, the crime of conspiracy has
been committed as soon as the agreement is made.20 Under the federal
statute, which requires an overt act, the crime would be committed if
one of the persons bought a gun or committed some other overt act.
21
Therefore, attempt cases do not, without qualification, apply to con-
spiracy. The holding in People v. Jaffee that the defendant was not
guilty of an attempt to receive stolen goods, because the goods were
not in fact stolen, does not mean necessarily that Jaffee could not have
been guilty of a conspiracy to receive stolen goods. If Jaffee had agreed
with another to receive stolen goods, he would have been guilty of
conspiracy under the common law rule, which does not require an
':The following seem to be at least three reasons for divergent views: (i)
subjective and objective views of crime and punishment; (2) nature of crime of
conspiracy; and (3) history of crime of conspiracy. Concerning reason i, see Sayre,
Criminal Attempts, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 821, 849 (1928); Ryu, Contemporary Problems
of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.UJ. Rev. 117o, 1187 (1957); concerning reason 2, see
Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 624 (1941); concern-
ing reason 3, see Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1922).
"Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 387 (1911) (Justice Holmes dissenting);
Miller, Criminal Law § 31 (1934); Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev.
393, 399 (1922).
"TSee note 16 supra.
2sPoulterer's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 556, 77 Eng. Rep. 813, 814 (1611); Piracci v. State,
207 Md. 499, 115 A.2d 262, 269 (1955); Hurvitz v. State, 200 Md. 578, 92 A.2d 575
(1952); Perkins, Criminal Law 531 (1957); Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy,
89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 624, 625, 629 (1941).
"'Regina v. M'Pherson, Rears. & Bell 197, 169 Eng. Rep. 975, 976 (1857); Ryu,
Contemporary Problems of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1170, 1183 (1957).
See note 18 supra.
62 Stat. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1953). United States v. Rabinowich, 238
U.S. 78, 85 (915); Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1937).
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overt act.2 2 And if he had received goods he thought stolen but which
were not, it would seem that this would be an overt act necessary to
complete the crime.
The second distinction which the Court of Appeals failed to note
is that there is a difference between a legal impossibility which ex-
tends only to the substantive act and a legal impossibility which ex-
tends to both intent to commit the act and to the consummation of
the act. An act is a crime only when declared to be so by law. When
the law declares that an act by a boy under a certain age is not a crime,
it would seem that it is a legal impossibility, not only for the boy to
commit the substantive crime, but also to commit the inchoate crimes
of attempt and conspiracy. The reason he cannot commit the inchoate
crimes is that the law declares that his intent to do such an act is not
criminal intent.23 Since criminal intent is the major element of an
inchoate crime,24 obviously such a crime cannot be committed unless
there is criminal intent. This was the situation in the Foster case: the
boy was incapable of committing any crime, either inchoate or sub-
stantive, by intending forcibly to know carnally a female and by forc-
ibly knowing her. This was so because the law declared that such in-
tent or such act by a boy under fourteen was not attempted rape or
rape. The legal impossibility existed from the mind's conception of
the act.
This argument also applies to O'Kelley v. United States,23 relied
upon by the Court of Appeals in the principal case. This case held
that there could not be a conspiracy to commit larceny of an inter-
state shipment of sugar because there could not be any substantive
violation, inasmuch as the sugar had lost its interstate character. There,
the legal impossibility extended not only to the act but to the intent
as well. The reason is that the evidence did not show an intent to
steal interstate sugar, but the evidence showed that the defendants
intended to steal sugar that had lost its interstate character. Therefore,
it would appear that the legal impossibility extended to the intent as
well as to the act. On the other hand, if the defendants had agreed to
steal interstate sugar and had committed the overt act of taking sugar
that had lost its interstate character, this would seem not to result in
a legal impossibility which would negative the criminal intent to steal
interstate sugar.
2See note i8 supra.
2'Perkins, Criminal Law 494 (x957).
21Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 624 (1941).
5116 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1941).
CASE COMMENTS
In the principal case the significant difference26 from the Foster
case and the O'Kelley case is that the legal impossibility extends only
to the substantive act and not to the intent, because the legal impossi-
bility does not exist from the time of the conception of the act but arises
only at the time of the act. Obviously, there was nothing to prevent
defendants in the principal case from violating section 186(a). The
federal law declares that it is a crime when more than one conspire
to violate a federal statute and an overt act is committed.2 7 Prior to
the time defendants paid Martin, there was no legal impossibility
which prevented the commission of the inchoate crime of conspiracy.
The legal impossibility in this case arose only at the time defendants
paid Martin, who was not in fact a representative of defendants' em-
ployees. Therefore, the legal impossibility extended only to the act
and not to the intent which existed earlier, or from the time of the
conception of the act or agreement. Unless a legal impossibility aris-
ing at the time of the act relates back to cover the intent which pre-
cedes the substantive act and makes it non-criminal, the legal impos-
sibility that the Court of Appeals relies upon in its decision is only
applicable to the substantive act.2 8 It does not apply to the inchoate
crime of conspiracy with which the defendants were charged. There-
fore, if defendants agreed to deal with Martin as a representative of
their employees and they committed the overt act of paying Martin,
the crime of conspiracy would seem to be complete, notwithstanding
the fact that Martin was not a representative of defendants' employees.
Neither legal impossibility nor mistaken identity prevented commis-
sion of the crime of conspiracy. PERRY E. MANN, JR.
51A third significant distinction which the Court of Appeals failed to make is
between inherent impossibility and legal impossibility. In fact, the court spoke
only of their similarity. The distinction is that where there is an inherent im-
possibility there can nevertheless be criminal intent, but where there is a legal im-
possibility which exists from the conception of the act or agreement there can
be no criminal intent, since the law says such intent is not criminal. This difference
is discernible in the contrary holdings of the Foster case and Hunt v. State, 114
Ark. 239, 169 SAV. 773 (1914). In the latter case a conviction of assault with intent
to rape of an impotent man seventy-four years old was upheld. In the Foster case
criminal intent was impossible, since a legal impossibility extended to both intent
and act. But in the Hunt case criminal intent was legally possible even though
consummation of the crime of rape was inherently impossible.
"See note 21 supra.
nFurthermore, the Court of Appeals says, "the present case is on the facts
of an even more extreme variety," for the prosecution claimed merely that "de-
fendants intended to deal with Martin 'as their employees' representative." If the
defendants intended to do and agreed to do what is forbidden by section 186(a)
and they paid Martin in order to achieve their ends, the conspiracy would seem to
be complete, even if they knew Martin was not such a representative. 242 F.2d 620,
6-5 (1957).
19581
